DECENCY V. THE ARTS: AND THE WINNER Is... THE
NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE ARTS?
Art has the power to provoke laughter, anger, joy, and disgust.'
Art has the power to open one's mind and perhaps the power to
See Neil Kendricks, Intentions Good on Road to "Happiness," SAN DIEGO
UNIONTRIB., Oct. 18, 1998, at El0 ("Solondz's new tragic comedy ['Happiness'] simultaneously pours salt into an open wound and provokes bursts of nervous laughter."); Steven Henry Madoff, "Pop Surrealism," ARTFORUM, Oct. 1, 1998, at 120 (reviewing an
exhibit at the Aldrich Museum of Contemporary Art where "so much of this art
smirks as it bleeds, prompting laughter of disbelief and a lacerating mordancy in
equal measure"); Elisabeth Mahoney, Streetworks, Streetleve Glasgow, SCOTSMAN
(Glasgow), Nov. 5, 1998, at 14 ("What this exhibition captures in a way individual
performances can't, is the wonderful range of responses from spectators. Usually
this is laughter. . . ."); Slamet A. Sjukur, Musicatreize Sings at Thirteen to the Dozen During Art Summit, JAKARTA POST, Oct. 10, 1998, (describing the contemporary music ensemble as "so unbelievably crazy that the audience.., fell into convulsions of laughter").
See Donald Lyons, It's Betty Buckley's Turn in 'Gypsy, 'WALL ST. J., Oct. 9, 1998, at
W12 (describing the fury, anger, and resentment portrayed in Betty Buckley's performance of "Rose's Turn" in the musical "Gypsy"); Cate McQuaid, Still Lifes with Secrets, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 20, 1997, at DI (describing photographer Benjamin Incerti as capturing the anger of the AIDS activist group, ACT UP, through his work);
Deborah Voorhees, John Biggers: An Artist Whose Works Embody the Pain and Passion of
Life, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Dec. 28, 1997, at lE (describing painter John Biggers's
early works as displaying bitterness and anger to the bigotry and poverty he had experienced); The Wall StreetJournalEurope's Guide to Leisure Time, WALL ST. J., Mar. 19,
1999, at 12 (commenting that the Nuevo Ballet Espanol's production of "Sangre"
presents the passions of love, anger, and peace within the first act).
See Donald Lyons, Jungle King"Camelot Queen, WALL ST. J., Nov. 14, 1997, at A16
(describing the Broadway hit, The Lion King "Right at the start, the whole building
explodes into joyous life"); Mervyn Rothstein, After 15 Years (15!), 'A Chorus Line'
Ends, N.Y. TIMsES, Apr. 30, 1990, at C3 ("In an evening filled with joy and sadness,
nostalgia and celebration, a capacity audience of 1,500 said farewell... to 'A Chorus
Line,' as the curtain came down ... for the 6,137th and final time .... ").
See C. Carr, A BrieffHistory of Outrage,VILLAGE VOIcE, Sept. 22, 1998, at 57 (listing
"avant-garde manifestations that changed the world because they stretched the
boundaries of what art can be"); Richard Dorment, The Arts: The Art of the Extreme,
DAILYTELEGRAPH (London), Sept. 6, 1995, at 16 ("Works of art are not always easy to
look at. Disgust and revulsion are as much the artist's province as beauty .... ");
Brandon Griggs, Ballet to Belly Dancers Will Shimmy, Shake at Liberty Park Belly Dancing:
Art Form, Not a Flesh Forum, SALT LAKE TRIB., Aug. 25, 1995, at El (quoting a dancer as
saying, "[pleople who haven't seen it think it's sort of like stripping. That either intrigues them or disgusts them ... ."); Is Tower a Beauty or Beast?, NEWS & OBSERVER

(Raleigh, N.C.), Aug. 27, 1995, at B2 (discussing public reaction to the new sculpture on Raleigh's Capitol Boulevard by indicating that "art lovers and Philistines
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heal.2 Art even has the power to demand the protection of the First
Amendment.3 But does art have the power to demand money from
alike were professing their admiration and disgust for the sculpture .. "); Deborah
Jowitt, Engaging the Darkness, VILLAGE VOICE, Aug. 29, 1995, at 81 (describing a Japanese Butoh performance in which "[the dancers] madden some spectators, frighten
or disgust some, exalt others"); Thomas Sowell, Random Thoughts on Slick Willy Nilly,
German Beer and Diversity, ATLANTAJ.-CONsT., July 19, 1995, at A14 (opining that art,

music, and literature have been treasured for their artistic beauty, "[blut add the
word 'modern' to art, music or literature and these things are far more likely to
produce puzzlement, boredom or disgust").
See Ann Brown, Expo Explores Utilizing Arts in Physical Healing, ARIZONA
DAILY
STAR, Oct. 23, 1998, at 10E (describing how participation in the arts can provide inspiration to an individual's spirit and improve one's health, and further quoting arts
therapist Sandra Wortzel as saying that "[u]sing the arts to access feeling and images
helps express what's inside that's creative and powerful .... The outcome could be
a dance of sadness, a song of anger or a painting of grief"); Sojane Martinez, Festival
Celebrates Women as Artists and Healers,PROVIDENCEJ., Nov. 5, 1998, at D1 (quoting art
therapist and historian Chris McCullough as saying, "Art heals. It goes beyond race,
class and gender .... There's no face on art. I can't tell if a Chinese, black or white
person created the art, but it touches the soul . . . ."); Jacqueline Trescott, Arts and

Letters Have Their Day at White House, WASH. POST, Nov. 6, 1998, at D1 (quoting President Clinton's tribute to actor Gregory Peck: "[H]is performances have helped to
heal some of our country's deepest wounds"); see also John E. Frohnmayer, Giving
Offense, 29 GONZ. L. REV. 1, 7 (1993/94). Frohnmayer argues that arts are important
to society because
[e]very child who has ever honestly written a poem or performed a
song or dance has been forever changed. That child has made a covenant of honesty and risk - of communication and commitment to a
community. That child has laid vulnerable a part of the self and has
placed faith in the audience to respond. That child has become a citizen.
Id. Frohnmayer further professes that art helps communities to grow. See id. ("We
have to rediscover the common ground among our 170 different ethnic and racial
groups. Art can help us do this. It can be a healer. It can be a window to understanding of other people, other cultures, other human beings.").
See U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment to the United States
Consti-

tution provides that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of
speech . . .. " The reasons behind this guarantee of free speech have enjoyed seem-

ingly endless debate. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis,
J., concurring) (declaring that "public discussion is a political duty; and that this
should be a fundamental principle of the American government"); Abrams v.
United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (asserting that "the
best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition
of the market .... "); THoMAs I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 7
(1970) (emphasizing that freedom of expression "promotes greater cohesion in a
society because people are more ready to accept decisions that go against them if
they have a part in the decision-making process"); ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE
SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 88 (1948) (arguing that truth must be
available to all citizens in a self-governed community and that the purpose of the
First Amendment "is to give to every voting member of the body politic the fullest
possible participation in the understanding of those problems with which... [they]
must deal"); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 12-1, at 785 (2d
ed. 1988) (declaring that the First Amendment's protection of the freedom of
speech is a "basic element of our fundamental law.. . ."); C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the
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the taxpayers' pockets? 4 Not only has this question fueled the long
standing debate over the role of government subsidies in the arts, but
it threatens to disturb the Supreme Court's delicate balance of First
Amendment rights with the censorship of indecent ideas.5
FirstAmendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964, 966 (1978) (reasoning that
"[s]peech is protected not as a means to a collective good but because of the value
of speech conduct to the individual"); David A.J. Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity
Law: Toward a Moral Theoy of the First Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 45, 62 (1974)
(noting that "the significance of free expression rests on the central human capacity
to create and express symbolic systems, such as speech, writing, pictures, and music ....
").
The Supreme Court has afforded artistic expression First Amendment protection. See Thomas P. Leff, The Arts: A TraditionalSphere of Free Expression?First Amendment Implications of Government Funding to the Arts in the Aftermath of Rust v. Sullivan, 45
AM. U. L. REv. 353, 393 (1995) (stating that "First Amendment protection for artistic
expression [has] developed in a piecemeal and haphazard fashion, often one artistic
medium at a time"); see also Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546,
552 (1975) (holding that a public auditorium's refusal to present the musical "Hair"
was an unconstitutional prior restraint); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 36 (1973)
(holding that all artistic expression, unless obscene in a legal sense, is protected by
the First Amendment); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 506 (1952)
(invalidating a statute that banned "sacrilegious" motion pictures).
4 See Frohnmayer, supra note 2, at 2 ("[T] he Savings and Loan scandal
will cost
each [taxpayer] $2,000 at least. The arts cost $.68 per year for everything we do.
The amount that you will have to pay for 'controversial art' is a microcent.").
Frohnmayer, Chairman of the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) from 1989 to
1992, also argues that offensive art deserves taxpayer funds:
Can citizens be compelled to pay for [offensive art]? ...Nothing in
the Constitution says that there shall be a National Endowment for the
Arts. If, however, the United States wants to be a leader in the realm
of ideas and of the spirit, to help us as citizens to understand who we
are, to humanize society, and to give to citizens, not just the right of
physical protection from enemies, but the environment in which they
can fulfill themselves in all of their intellectual, emotional and spiritual
selves, then the government absolutely should promote the arts.
Id. But see ALL THINGS CONSIDERED (Transcript of National Public Radio, Inc., Apr. 2,
1997) (David Brooks, arts funding commentator, stated, "Surely the founding fathers would be horrified to find the federal government funding a bunch of artists
.... Taxpayers shouldn't have to fund art that assaults their values."); Matthew
Carolan & Raymond J. Keating, Funding the NEA: Affluent Art Pork, NEWSDAY, July 22,
1997, at A31 (arguing that taxpayers' money used to support the NEA is
"redistributing income from the less well off to entertain the more affluent in the
cities .. ").
5 The Supreme Court has interpreted the First Amendment as protective
of indecent speech. See Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2346, 2348 (1997) (holding that
the Communications Decency Act, which banned the dissemination of indecent materials to minors, was void for vagueness and overbroad); Sable v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115,
126 (1989) (holding that legislation prohibiting indecent commercial phone messages was not narrowly tailored); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 565
(1991) (holding that a public indecency statute requiring nude dancers to wear Gstrings and pasties was not violative of the First Amendment).
Although indecent speech receives protection under the auspices of the First
Amendment, there is no constitutional right to receive a government subsidy. See
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In protecting the guarantee of free expression, the Supreme
Court has utilized constitutional doctrines to shield individuals from
government restrictions that may have a "chilling effect" on speech.6
For instance, statutes that prohibit constitutionally forbidden speech,
but also deter protected speech, will be struck down as overbroad.7
Laws that are drafted unclearly are in danger of vagueness challenges.' Additionally, restrictions that target a particular viewpoint
discriminate impermissibly when the government is funding and enPerry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) (holding that a state college professor's lack of tenure, taken alone, did not refute his claim that his free speech rights
were violated when his contract was not renewed). Nonetheless, the government
may not deny an individual a subsidy based on reasons that would infringe upon a
constitutionally protected interest, especially First Amendment interests. See id. To
do so would "produce a result which the State could not command directly."
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958) (holding that a refusal to grant a tax exemption because of engaging in proscribed speech would coerce the claimants to
refrain from such speech ). But see Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 549 (1983) (establishing that "a legislature's decision not to
subsidize the exercise of a fundamental right does not infringe upon the
right... ."); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 466, 474 (1977) (holding that a Connecticut statute that does not fund nontherapeutic abortions but provides money for
childbirth does not violate the Constitution); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 105-06
(1976) (holding that a statute providing federal subsidies to candidates who enter
primary campaigns, but does not offer funds to candidates who do not participate in
primaries, does not infringe upon First Amendment rights). See generally Thomas
Peter Kimbis, Planningto Survive: How the National Endowmentfor the Arts Restructured
Itself to Serve a New Constituency, 21 COLUM.-VLAJ.L. & ARTs 239 (1997) (providing a
historical summary of the NEA's restructuring process and its political context);
Leff, supra note 3 (discussing the debate over federal funding of the arts and the
constitutional limits of funding restrictions); Robert C. Post, Subsidized Speech, 106
YALE L.J. 151 (1996) (discussing First Amendment challenges to subsidized speech).
6 See BLACK'S LAw DicnoNARY 240 (6th ed. 1990). A statute that has
a chilling
effect "seriously discourag[es] the exercise of a constitutional right, e.g. the right of
appeal" or the right of free speech. Id.; see also TRIBE, supra note 3, § 12-31, at 1034
(describing the chilling effect of vague laws not as a lack of fair notice, but as overly
effective, because individuals will curtail their expression to speech that is undeniably safe under the statute); Henry P. Monaghan, First Amendment "Due Process," 83
HARv. L. REv. 518, 519 (1970) (discussing how procedural guarantees, like substantive rules, can "chill" free expression).
7 See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 104 (1940). The overbreadth
doctrine
applies to statutes that prohibit activities that may be constitutionally forbidden but
also prohibit activities that are protected by the First Amendment. See id. Essentially, statutes that are overbroad may deter a speaker from exercising his constitutionally protected right of free speech. See id.; see also Note, The First Amendment
Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARv. L. REV. 844, 853-58 (1970) (discussing the rationale of
the "chilling effect").
8 See BLAcK'S LAw DIcnoNAY, supra note 6, at 1549. The vagueness
doctrine requires that statutes explicitly define what conduct is proscribed so that the danger of
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is avoided. See id.; Anthony G. Amsterdam, The Void for Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67, 81
(1960) (arguing that the void-for-vagueness doctrine determines how far a public
order can deprive citizens' rights).
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couraging a variety of messages, yet when the government passes
regulations to further its own message, such discrimination is constitutional. 9
Though art has been a significant influence in American history,
the primary source of funding for artists prior to the twentieth century was the benevolence of wealthy patrons."0 Despite the efforts of
several presidents to provide federal support for the arts," it was not
until Congress created the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA),
brandishing noble goals of creative and cultural diversity, that the
first federal
agency dedicated to the support of the arts was estab2
lished.
See infra notes 71-72 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's
position in Rosenbergerv. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia that when the
government is disseminating its own message it may engage in viewpoint discrimination, but the government must remain viewpoint-neutral when funding individual
speakers to encourage a diversity of views).
10 See Leff, supra note 3, at 361-62. Leff indicates that although artistic works
were often commissioned by government entities and music was a longstanding tradition in the American military, sponsorship of artistic events was primarily provided
by "aristocrats and the newly emerging bourgeoisie." Id. at 362. Leff notes that Benjamin Franklin was a lifelong patron of the arts, creating the country's first library,
the first hospital, and the Pennsylvania Academy of the Arts. See id. at n.33. Additionally, Leff observes:
Such figures as Peter Cooper, Cornelius Vanderbilt, Andrew Mellon,
J.P. Morgan, Andrew Carnegie, John Rockefeller, Thomas Corcoran,
John Hay Whitney, and Solomon R. Guggenheim built theaters and
museums, created symphony orchestras, and supported the founding
of art academies.
Id. (citing ALVIN TOFFLER, THE CULTURE CONSUMERS 170 (1964)).
1 See id. at 361 n.32. Presidents Buchanan, Roosevelt, and Taft unsuccessfully
attempted to establish agencies devoted to arts funding. See id. Congress took steps
to support unemployed artists during the New Deal era by establishing arts programs
within the Works Progress Adminstration. See id. at 362. The success of these projects, which helped such artists as Jackson Pollack, Orson Welles, and Aaron
Copeland, was curtailed by World War II. See id. In 1955, President Eisenhower unsuccessfully attempted to create a federal arts organization, and both President Kenned' and PresidentJohnson included arts advisors on their staffs. See id. at 363.
See id. at 364. By establishing the National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities in 1965 (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 951 (1994)), which is devoted to the education, support, and advancement of the arts and humanities, Congress demonstrated
its commitment to arts education and the need to foster artists with public sponsorship. See Leff, supra note 3, at 363-64. The NEA serves as a subgroup within the National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities and is designated to fulfill Congress's
promise of arts sponsorship. See 20 U.S.C. § 954(a). In explaining the role of the
National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities, Congress stated:
(10) It is vital to a democracy to honor and preserve its multicultural
artistic heritage as well as support new ideas, and therefore it is essential to provide financial assistance to its artists and the organizations
that support their work.
(11) To fulfill its educational mission, achieve an orderly continuation
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The NEA accomplishes its goal of promoting excellence in the
arts by awarding grants to individuals or private groups that are traditionally overlooked for financial assistance. 3 Although the NEA's
grant-evaluation process had proven successful in the past, the agency
became embroiled in a heated controversy when it provided funds to
two artists whose work was deemed obscene by members of Congress." A battle ensued as to the appropriate balance of federal support for artists and trepidation toward government censorship. 15
of free society, and provide models of excellence to the American
people, the Federal Government must transmit the achievement and
values of civilization from the past via the present to the future, and
make widely available the greatest achievements of art.

20 U.S.C. § 951.

See 20 U.S.C. § 954(c). Section 954(c) emphasizes the importance of supporting artists who achieve artistic and cultural significance, especially those who "would
otherwise be unavailable to our citizens for geographic or economic reasons." Id. at
(c) (2). Support for the local arts initiative is also a goal of the NEA. See id. at (c) (4)
("[support for projects] that reach, or reflect the culture of, a minority, inner city,
rural, or tribal community").
1
See NEA v. Finley, 118 S.Ct. 2168, 2172 (1998) ("Throughout the NEA's history, only a handful of the agency's roughly 100,000 awards have generated formal
complaints about misapplied funds or abuse of the public's trust."); see also 136
CONG. REc. S17,979 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1990) (statement of Sen. Jeffords) ("The national attention focused on the NEA involved two particular artists. Together these
grants account for less than 3/100 of 1 percent of the total 1988 Arts Endowment
budget."); S. REP. No. 101-472, at 2 (1990) (commending the NEA's contributions to
America's cultural and economic progress and stating that prior to 1990, approximately 85,000 grants had been awarded to nonprofit organizations and individuals).
With the NEA's authorization due to expire in 1990, controversy arose in 1988
when two NEA grants funded photo exhibitions of Andres Serrano's "Piss Christ"
(portraying a crucifix immersed in Serrano's urine) and Robert Mapplethorpe's
work entitled "Robert Mapplethorpe: The Perfect Moment" (displaying homoeroticism, sadomasichism, and naked children). See Raleigh Douglas Herbert, Survey,
National Endowment for the Arts - The Federal Government's Funding of the Arts and the
Decency Clause - 20 U S.C. § 954(d)(1) (1990), 18 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 413, 415-16
(1993). Members of Congress criticized the NEA for subsidizing these works, including SenatorJesse Helms, who introduced an amendment disallowing the use of NEA
funds to subsidize obscene or indecent art. See id. A revised amendment prohibiting subsidies to obscene projects lacking "serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value" was eventually passed. See id. at 417. This amendment was later found
unconstitutional. See Bella Lewitsky Dance Found. v. Frohnmayer, 754 F. Supp. 774,
785 (C.D. Cal. 1991).
Congress also created an Independent Commission to review the NEA's grantmaking procedures. See Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-121, § 304(b)(2)(D), 103 Stat. 701, 742
(1989).
15See Leff, supra note 3, at 369 (discussing the tension between supporting artists' creative talents and the fear of government censorship). The fight to find an
acceptable balance between creative freedom and censorship was waged in Congress, where both the House and the Senate drafted amendments to the NEA's upcoming reauthorization. See 136 CONG. REC. H9406-07 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1990)
13
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Amidst this struggle, the United States Supreme Court recently
considered whether the government should take into account general standards of decency when awarding federal subsidies to the arts
in National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley.'6 In this case, the Court
upheld a 1990 amendment requiring the NEA to contemplate decency criteria when evaluating grant applications, thereby holding
that the provision did not restrict First Amendment liberties nor was
it unconstitutionally vague. 7
Karen Finley, 8 along with John Fleck,' 9 Holly Hughes, 0 and Tim
Miller, 2' applied for NEA grants as solo performance artists.2 Despite
(statement of Rep. Beilenson) (reviewing the five proposed amendments to the NEA
appropriations bill). Congress eventually compromised by ratifying the WilliamsColeman Amendment, requiring the chairman to consider general standards of decency in funding decisions. See 136 CONG. REc. H9681 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 1990)
(statement of Rep. Weiss) (discussing how the Williams-Coleman Amendment was
preferable to the other proposed amendments). This amendment was included in
the NEA's reauthorization legislation. See 20 U.S.C. § 954(d) (1994).
16 118 S.
Ct. 2168 (1998).
17 SeeFinley, 118 S. Ct. at 2171-72 (citing 20 U.S.C.
§ 954(d)(1)).
18 See id. at 2174. Finley is a performance artist who focuses her work on feminist
themes. See Mike Steele, Finley Ready to Make Another Scene, STAR-TRIB. (MinneapolisSt. Paul), Mar. 25, 1998, at 4E (observing that Finley's work tackles tough issues and
is gaining acceptance in the art world). Finley is best known for the part of her show
"We Keep Our Victims Ready" in which she strips to the waist and smears chocolate
syrup and alfalfa sprouts over her body. See Peter Parisi, Comeuppancefor Trash Art,
WASH. TIMES, July 17, 1998, at A17. The chocolate symbolizes feces, the sprouts represent sperm, and together they protest society's degradation of women. See id.
Finley's recent works include "The American Chestnut," which uses video clips
to complement her monologue about life in a small town. See Neil Kendricks, Finley
Throws Her 'Chestnuts' into the Fire of Social Commentay, SAN DIEGO UNION-TIUB., May
14, 1998, at 19 (describing one video segment in which Finley squirts her breast milk
onto black velvet and another clip wherein she runs nude through a museum and
poses with nude statues). In her newest show, "The Return of the ChocolateSmeared Woman," Finley once again smears chocolate on her body, bathes on stage,
and describes imaginary sexual encounters with Bill Clinton, Kenneth Starr, Jesse
Helms, and others. See Christopher Rapp, Chocoholic, NAT'L REV., July 20, 1998, at 35.
19 See Finley, 118 S. Ct. at 2174.
Fleck is a performance artist and actor best
known for urinating into a toilet bowl containing a picture of Jesus. See 136 CONG.
RFc. E2673 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1990) (statement of Rep. Dornan) (citing David Gergen, Who Should Pay for Porn?,U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,July 30, 1990, at 80).
20 See Finley, 118 S.Ct. at 2174.
Hughes is a performance artist and playwright
whose work focuses on lesbian themes. See 136 CONG. REc. E2673 (daily ed. Aug. 3,
1990) (statement of Rep. Dornan) (citing Gergen, supra note 19). Hughes's show
includes a scene in which she states that she saw 'Jesus between Mother's hips" while
inserting her hand in her vagina. See id.
21 See Finley, 118 S. Ct. at 2174. Miller explores
homosexual themes in his work as
a performance artist and author. See 136 CONG. REC. E2673 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1990)
(statement of Rep. Dornan) (citing Gergen, supra note 19).
See Finley, 118 S. Ct. at 2174. At the time, § 954(d) had yet to be amended to
include the "decency and respect" clause. See id.
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a positive recommendation by the advisory panel,23 the NEA ultimately denied funding to these artists in June 1990.4 The artists filed
suit, claiming that the NEA rejected their applications for political
reasons2 5 in violation of their First Amendment rights and that the
NEA failed to follow proper statutory procedure.26 Further, the artists
alleged that the NEA violated the Privacy Act by releasin confidential information from their grant applications to the press.
In December 1990, Congress enacted 20 U.S.C. § 954(d), an
amendment to the NEA's reauthorization statute, to provide that the
NEA consider "general standards of decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American public 28 when evaluating
23

See id. Applications are first reviewed by an advisory panel comprised of ex-

perts in the particular field. See 20 U.S.C. § 959(c)(1)-(2) (1994). After an advisory
panel unanimously recommended approval of the four artists' projects, NEA Chairperson John E. Frohnmayer asked the panel to reconsider its decision in May 1990.
See NEA v. Finley, 795 F. Supp. 1457, 1462 (C.D. Cal. 1992). The panel once again
unanimously recommended approval. See id.
24 See Finley, 118 S. Ct. at 2174. The advisory panel reports
to the National Council on the Arts (Council), which in turn makes recommendations to the Chairperson
on funding decisions. See 20 U.S.C. § 955(f) (1994). The Chairperson is appointed
by the President with the approval and consent of the Senate. See id. § 954(b)(1).
The Council recommended disapproval of the four artists' applications to Chairperson Frohnmayer. SeeFinley, 118 S.Ct. at 2174.
25 See Finley, 118 S. Ct. at 2174. The NEA was embroiled
in a political controversy
that began in 1989 when grants were given to institutions sponsoring works from
Robert Mapplethorpe and Andres Serrano. See id. at 2172; see also 135 CONG. REC.
S12,116 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1989) (statement of Sen. Danforth) ("I am not for Mapplethorpe. I am sick that a dollar of taxpayer money went to pay for this kind of
junk."). The controversy over the NEA's grant-making process continued through
1990 when Congress considered the NEA's reauthorization. See Finley, 118 S.Ct. at
2172. During this tumultuous period in arts funding, the four artists applied for and
were subsequently denied NEA grants. See Finley v. NEA, 795 F. Supp. at 1462.
The artists' initial complaint alleged that the NEA did not provide a written explanation of its denial and further alleged that the NEA based the denial on their
past artistic expressions in violation of their First Amendment rights. See id. at 1463.
26 See Finley, 795 F. Supp. at 1462-63. The complaint alleged that
the NEA relied
on political criteria outside the scope of§ 954(c). See id. The artists further claimed
that the NEA denied their grant applications to appease members of Congress, despite the panel's finding of artistic merit. See id. at 1465. Finally, the complaint alleged that Frohnmayer violated procedures set forth in 20 U.S.C. § 955(f) by polling
Council members individually for their recommendations on the artists' applications. See id.
27 See id. at 1466. The artists alleged that the NEA leaked information
from their
grant applications to the press in violation of 5 U.S.C. § 552(a). See id.
20 U.S.C. § 954(d). The amendment provides in relevant part:
In establishing such regulations and procedures, the Chairperson shall
ensure that (1) artistic excellence and artistic merit are the criteria by which applications are judged, taking into consideration general standards of
decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American
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grant applications.2 The artists subsequently amended their complaint to attack this new provision as impermissibly viewpoint-based
in violation of the First Amendment because it hinders the NEA from
funding art that is categorized as "indecent" or "disrespectful."3° The
artists further alleged that the subjective terminology of § 954(d) (1)
does not definitively notify applicants of NEA requirements and,
therefore, it is void for vagueness in violation of the First and Fifth
Amendments.3 ' Additionally, the artists added the National Association of Artists' Organizations (NAAO) as a plaintiff."" The United
States District Court for the Central District of California granted
summary judgment in favor of the artists, holding that § 954(d) (1) is
overbroad on its face in violation of the due process requirement of
the Fifth Amendment."
public; and
(2) applications are consistent with the purposes of this section. Such
regulations and procedures shall clearly indicate that obscenity is
without artistic merit, is not protected speech, and shall not be
funded.
Id.

SeeFinley, 118 S. Ct. at 2173.
See id. at 2174. A government regulation cannot restrict speech by preferring
some messages over others. See Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch.
Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 393-94 (1993) (holding that a school district's refusal to allow a
religious group to use school property after hours, even though the school was available for "social, civic and recreational meetings," was impermissibly viewpointbased). Moreover, the government may not choose to fund some types of speech
and not others based on the viewpoints expressed. See Rosenberger v. Rector and
Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 845 (1995) (holding that a public university's decision to fund certain student publications, but not publications with a religious perspective, is a viewpoint-based policy and violative of the First Amendment).
The artists claimed that § 954(d)(1) forces the NEA to deny funds to artists expressing an indecent message and that such disfavorable treatment amounts to an impermissibly viewpoint-based policy. See Finley, 118 S. Ct. at 2175.
s1 See Finley, 795 F. Supp. at 1471. The due process clause of the Fifth Amendment mandates that a statute must be "clearly defined so as not to cause persons 'of
common intelligence - necessarily [to] guess at its meaning and [to] differ as to its
application.'" Id. (quoting Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391
(1926)) (alterations in original). Vague laws can impair expression by (1) failing to
provide adequate warning, thereby punishing innocent people; (2) failing to provide objective standards, thus leading to arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement;
and (3) inhibiting the exercise of free speech by leading people away from an
"unlawful zone." See id. Because of subjective terms like "decency" and "respect,"
the artists claimed that § 954(d)(1) does not inform applicants of NEA requirements. See id. at 1472. One of the artists' main concerns was that an individual
might steer away from creating a work that is potentially indecent in the eyes of the
NEA, thereby amounting to self-censorship. See ii.
32 See Finley, 118S. Ct.
at 2174.
ss See id. Initially, the NEA moved for judgment on the pleadings. See Finley, 795
F. Supp. at 1460. The district court denied the motion and subsequently granted
the artists' motion for summary judgment. See id. at 1476. The district court held
29
30
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On appeal, a divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district
court.Y The circuit court held that the "decency and respect" criteria
in § 954(d) (1) are difficult to define objectively and further held that
the risk of arbitrary and discriminatory application of this provision
violates both the First and Fifth Amendments.5 In the alternative,
the circuit court concluded that § 954(d) (1) constitutes a viewpointbased restriction on protected speech in violation of the First
Amendment.'
To determine the constitutionality of § 954(d) (1) and the NEA's
amended grant-evaluation process, the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari.31 The Court reversed the decision of the Ninth
that § 954(d) (1) was void for vagueness under the Fifth Amendment because it does
not notify applicants of the requirements necessary to comply with decency standards. See id. at 1472. The district court further professed that there are no "general
standards of decency." See id. (citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 10809 (1926)).
The court's First Amendment analysis also focused on the overbreadth of
§ 954(d) (1). See id. at 1476. A statute is overbroad if it not only prohibits speech
that is constitutionally forbidden, but also prohibits speech that is constitutionally
protected. See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 104-05 (1940) (invalidating a statute proscribing loitering as overbroad because it embraced almost all means for interested parties to inform the public about a labor dispute). The district court
opined that § 954(d)(1) is overbroad on its face because it discourages the NEA
from funding indecent speech, thereby constraining a significant amount of protected speech. See Finley, 795 F. Supp. at 1476.
SeeFinley v. NEA, 100 F.3d 671, 683-84 (9th Cir. 1996).
See id. In so holding, the court concluded that § 954(d) (1) forces the NEA to
judge grant applications based on "'general standards of decency and respect for the
diverse beliefs and values of the American public.'" Id. at 680 (quoting 20 U.S.C.
§ 954(d)(1) (1994)). The court explained that the statute's failure to define this
standard of decency causes ambiguity and forces ordinary people to speculate about
the meaning of the terms, leading to different interpretations as to how these terms
should be applied. See id. at 680 (citing Connally, 269 U.S. at 391). According to the
court, this vagueness may lead to arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of
§ 954(d) (1) because the NEA's decision will partially depend on the views of the individuals judging the applications. See id. at 680-81. The court determined that the
"decency" criterion is vague under the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment
and could have a "chilling effect" on speech protected by the First Amendment. See
id. at 681.
36 See id. at 681. The court stressed that governmental
funding of arts cannot be
viewpoint discriminatory. See id. at 683. The court said that government neutrality is
required because this area is both a "traditional sphere of free expression" and an
area that the government has intended to "encourage a diversity of views from private speakers." Id. at 681-82 (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the
Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 834 (1995); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 200 (1991)).
The court found that by requiring applicants to comport with the "decency" and
"respect" standards of § 954(d) (1), the government is viewpoint discriminatory because
treats indecent art disfavorably. See id. at 682.
1 37 it
SeeNEAv.
Finley, 118 S. Ct. 554 (1997).
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Circuit and determined that the "decency and respect" clause serves
as advisory language that does not restrict the NEA from subsidizing
indecent art.3 In reaching this decision, the Court concluded that
the amendment is not viewpoint discriminatory because, instead of
forcing the NEA to reject art that fails to comport with mainstream
standards of decency, the provision directs the NEA merely to consider decency in addition to other criteria in the selection process."
The Court further declared that § 954(d) (1) is not void for vagueness
because the decency criteria only adds further considerations to an
inherently subjective process.4
Throughout the evolution of First Amendment jurisprudence,
the Supreme Court has examined both the type of speech afforded
protection and the method used to restrict or limit speech to determine whether a statute's language will have a "chilling effect" on expression.
Concerns over the possible deterrence of free speech
arise when a statute is vague or overbroad. The Supreme Court addressed vagueness problems by establishing the void-for-vagueness

See Finley, 118 S. Ct. at 2176, 2180. In essence, the Court held that § 954(d)(1)
is not an absolute restriction on the funding of indecent art and has not affirmatively
constrained the NEA's grant-making authority. See id. at 2175-76. The Court interpreted the amendment as adding considerations to the review process but not specifying that "decency" and "respect" are to be given any particular weight in the award
decision. See id.at 2175.
39 See id. at 2176. The Court referred to the legislative
history of the amendment
to stress that the "decency and respect" clause incorporates additional criteria into
the award process and does not disfavor applicants because of their ideas or perspectives. See id.Moreover, the Court emphasized that the amendment's goal is to reform procedures and not to proscribe speech. See id. The Court did not perceive a
threat of censorship due to the considerations of "decency" and "respect." See id.
Multiple interpretations of these terms will prevent the preclusion of particular
views, according to the Court. See id. at 2176-77; Respondents' Brief at 41, Finley
(No. 97-371) (stating "[o]ne would be hard-pressed to find two people in the United
States who could agree on what the 'diverse beliefs and values of the American public' are, much less on whether a particular work of art 'respects' them").
40 See Finley, 118 S. Ct. at 2176. The Court admitted that
both "decency" and
"respect" are vague terms, but when the government is funding programs rather
than regulating programs, clarity may not be feasible. See id.at 2179. The Court
analogized the NEA's grant-making process to government scholarships and indicated that all such programs can be considered vague because of their inherently
subjective criteria. See id.at 2179-80. Scholarship or grant programs expand the opportunity for individual expression and do not abridge the freedom of speech of
those persons who do not receive funding. See Reply Brief for Petitioners at 16, Finley, (No. 97-371).
41 See supra note 6 (discussing the chilling effect of overbroad and
vague statutes).
42 See supra note 8 (discussing the constitutional
perils of the vagueness doctrine); supra note 7 (reviewing the overbreadth doctrine).
M
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doctrine in ConnaUy v. General Construction Co.43 In Connally, the
Court decided for the first time that a law that causes an average person to guess at its meaning and application is void on its face." Further, the Court emphasized that when a law is open to varying interpretations, instead of precise statutory or judicial definition, the
guarantee of due process is abandoned. 45
The Court further articulated the vagueness doctrine in Grayned
4 In holding that a law is void for vagueness if
v. City of Rockford."
its
restrictions are unclear, the Court first determined that a statute
must give citizens fair warning of exactly what conduct is prohibited.
Second, the Court explained that the statute must delineate precise
269 U.S. 385 (1926). At issue in Connally was an Oklahoma statute providing
that state employees who work an eight-hour day be paid the current per diem rate
of the locality where the work is performed. See id. at 388. A violation of this statute
resulted in a fine or imprisonment. See id. The construction company in Connally
wanted to enjoin enforcement of the statute because the Commissioner of Labor
determined that the company should be paying its employees higher wages. See id.
at 388-89. An interlocutory appeal was granted. See id. at 391. The Supreme Court
held that the terms "locality" and "current rate of wages" were both vague and did
not inform persons who would be liable under the statute of the conduct they had to
obez. See id. at 393-95. The Court therefore found the statute invalid. See id. at 393.
See id. at 394-95. The Court cited the reasoning of United States v. Capital Traction Co., 34 App. D.C. 592, 597 (1910), in which the court held that the difference
between conduct that is legal and conduct that is illegal cannot be left to speculation. See Connally, 269 U.S. at 392. The Court in Connally observed that because of
the vague language, the rate of wages will vary among different employers. See id. at
395. The Court surmised that a criminal statute cannot rest upon such an uncertain
calculation. See id.
45 See Connally, 269 U.S. at 395. The Court further admitted that
the enforcement of vague statutes is "as likely to defeat the purpose of the Legislature as to
promote it." Id. at 394.
46 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
47 See id. at 108. The statute at issue in Grayned
was an anti-noise law that prohibited persons on grounds next to a school building from making any noise that disturbed the peace or disrupted the classes while school was in session. See id. at 10708. Richard Grayned was convicted for taking part in a demonstration in front of an
Illinois high school where African-American protesters carried signs urging equal
treatment. See id. at 105. Grayned was convicted of violating the anti-noise statute,
as well as an anti-picketing statute. See id. at 106. On appeal, Grayned challenged
the statutes as overbroad and void for vagueness, but the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision. See City of Rockford v. Grayned, 46 11. 2d 492,
493, 498 (1970). The Supreme Court found the anti-picketing statute unconstitutional on equal protection grounds, but held that the anti-noise statute was not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. See Grayned, 408 U.S. at 107-08. The Supreme
Court found that the anti-noise statute was clear as to what conduct was prohibited
because it forbade noisy or diversionary actions that would disrupt school classes at
specified times of the day. See id. at 110-11. Moreover, the Court determined that
the statute plainly defined the prohibited disturbances as those that would disrupt
classes; therefore, it gave citizens fair warning of the conduct being proscribed. See
id. at 112.
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standards to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory application."
Third, the Court stated that when a statute addresses an area traditionally protected by the First Amendment, the language must not
cause citizens to "'steer far wider of the unlawful zone [than]
if the
9
boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly marked."
In addition to examining the method of regulation, the Court
will also examine the speaker's mode of expression when evaluating
the constitutionality of speech restrictions. 50 In FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,5' the Supreme Court established that constitutionally protected indecent speech could be regulated to protect children from
offensive material. 52 The Court distinguished this decency restriction
See Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108-09. The Court distinguished the anti-noise statute
in this case from general breach of the peace ordinances. See id. at 113 (citing
Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971) (holding that an ordinance prohibiting three or more people from assembling on the sidewalk, if they are annoying to
passersby, is impermissibly vague because of the subjective meaning of "annoying");
Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 578-79 (1965) (finding that a breach of the peace
statute could be interpreted to punish persons who merely expressed an unpopular
view)). The Court concluded that the anti-noise statute does not invite subjective
interpretation or arbitrary enforcement because it clearly provides that the conduct
will be punished only if it interferes with classes. See id. at 113-14.
49 Id. at 109 (quoting Baggett v. Bullitt, 377
U.S. 360, 372 (1964)). The Court
stated that precise language in a statute indicates that the legislature has thoroughly
considered First Amendment interests that may be affected and has determined that
regulation islstill necessary based on additional public policy concerns. See id. at 109
n.5 (citing Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 236 (1963)); see also Amsterdam,
supra note 8, at 81 (arguing that the void-for-vagueness doctrine determines how far
a public order can deprive citizens' rights); TRIBE, supra note 3, § 12-31, at 1033
(discussing the acceptable level of vagueness and stating that "to draft with narrow
particularity is to risk nullification by easy evasion of the legislative purpose; to draft
with great generality is to risk ensnarement of the innocent in a net designed for
others").
50 See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 744
(1978).
51 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
52 See id. at 746. In Pacifica, a New York, listener-supported radio
station aired a
monologue about contemporary speech by comedian George Carlin. See id. at 72930. In this 12-minute monologue, Carlin listed words, including "cocksucker,"
"shit," and "twat," and repeated them continuously. See id. at 729, 750-55. A listener
filed a complaint with the FCC, and the FCC issued a declaratory order indicating
that Pacifica could receive sanctions in the future if further complaints were received. See id. at 730. The order further stated that the broadcast was indecent and
was prohibited by 18 U.S.C. § 1464, which provides that the broadcast of obscene,
indecent or profane words will result in fines or imprisonment. See id. at 731. The
FCC also relied on 47 U.S.C. § 303(g), which requires the FCC to use the radio in
the public's interest. See id. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit reversed, finding the FCC's actions were a form of censorship and
were overbroad. See Pacifica Found. v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9, 10-11 (D.C. Cir. 1977). The
Supreme Court upheld the FCC's order, holding that the monologue was indecent.
See Pacofca, 438 U.S. at 741, 751. The Court noted that an order "that indecent language be avoided will have its primary effect on the form, rather than the content, of

1526

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:1513

from an impermissible viewpoint restriction by reasoning that modes
of expression, including decency, are not a central component of the
speaker's message." Therefore, the Court held that prohibiting the
broadcast of a monologue that uses profane language is not an objection to the speaker's viewpoint, but rather a restriction on the mode
of the expression.5' Moreover, the Court indicated a willingness to
restrict modes of expression when a strong countervailing interest is
at stake. 55
Another issue with which the Court has long struggled is the
First Amendment protections afforded to government-subsidized
speech.5 In Regan v. Taxation With Representation,57 the Court determined that funding restrictions that are both content-neutral and
viewpoint-neutral pass constitutional muster.' The Court equated
serious communication. There are few, if any, thoughts that cannot be expressed by
the use of less offensive language." Id. at 743 n.18.
53 See Paczflca, 438 U.S. at 746 & n.22. The Court relied
on Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), to establish that indecent speech is low value speech
that may be regulated to protect a countervailing interest. See id. at 746 (citing
Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572, wherein the Court stated that "such utterances are no
essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step
to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the
social interest in order and morality.").
See Padqflea, 438 U.S. at 746 n.22. The Court stressed that Carlin's monologue
did not argue a point of view, but instead illustrated that contemporary attitudes towards profanity are ridiculous. See i&.The Court found that the FCC "objects, not to
this point of view, but to the way in which it is expressed." Id. This mode of expression, noted the Court, does not necessarily carry First Amendment protection. See
id.
5 See id. at 749-50.
The Court determined that the context of the monologue
was important in deciding whether the FCC's actions were constitutional. See id at
747-48. Because the monologue was broadcast in the early afternoon, the Court
found that the FCC could prohibit the broadcast in order to protect children from
offensive material. See id. at 749-50.
See Leff, supra note 3, at 392-412 (discussing the tension between government
action and support for the arts).
57 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
59 See id at 548. The Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 501 (c)
(3), states that
exemptions are granted to organizations that do not participate substantially in lobbying efforts except for veterans organizations. See id. at 542. Taxation With Representation of Washington (TWR), a non-profit corporation, was denied tax-exempt
status because of its lobbying activities. See id,at 54142. TWR filed suit in federal
district court for First and Fifth Amendment violations, arguing that Congress had
decided to fund lobbying by veterans organizations, but refused to fund lobbying of
other qualifying organizations. See id. at 542, 547. After an award of summary
judgment for the defendants, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed. See id. at 542. The Supreme Court found that the IRS's conditions for
exemption did not violate the First or Fifth Amendments because Congress has wide
discretion to fund selectively organizations in the public's interest. See id.at 550.
Further, the Court noted that "[the] Code does not deny TWR the right to receive
deductible contributions to support its non-lobbying activity, nor does it deny TWR
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tax exemptions with government subsidies and held that a statute
that grants tax exemptions to nonprofit organizations that do not
substantially participate in lobbying activities does not violate the
First Amendment. 9 This discretionary allocation of tax exemptions,
the Court concluded, is a proper exercise of congressional authority
and is not an attempt to suppress speech.The Court in Rust v. Sullivan6 ' tried to define Congress's discretionary powers in a funding context by holding that the government
can selectively subsidize a program that promotes certain goals without also subsidizing an alternate program that addresses these goals
in a different way.6f Building on the rationale used in Taxation With
any independent benefit on account of its intention to lobby. Congress has merely
refused to pay for the lobbying out of public monies." Id. at 545
See id. at 548. The Court relied on Cammarano v. United States, in which the
Court held that the First Amendment does not require Congress to subsidize lobbying. See id. at 513 (citation omitted). The Court noted that Congress is not acting in
its regulatory capacity when it denies tax-exempt status to organizations that lobby,
nor has it infringed on any existing First Amendment rights; rather, it has merely
chosen not to finance TWR's lobbying. See id. at 546. The Court reiterated that "a
legislature's decision not to subsidize the exercise of a fundamental right does not
infringe [upon) the right .... ." Id. at 549; see also Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 466,
474 (1977) (holding that a Connecticut statute that does not fund nontherapeutic
abortions but provides funds for childbirth does not violate the Constitution); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 105-06 (1976) (holding that a statute providing federal subsidies to candidates who enter primary campaigns, but not to candidates who do not
participate in primaries, does not infringe upon First Amendment rights).
60 See Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. at 550. The Court
opined that Congress has broad powers to make funding decisions to support or encourage activities
that will benefit the public interest. See id (citing Maher, 432 U.S. at 476)
("[Congress's] power to encourage actions deemed to be in the public interest is
necessarily far broader.").
61

500 U.S. 173 (1991).

62

See id. at 193. The statute at issue in Rust was Title X of the Public Health Serv-

ice Act, which provides government funds to family planning services. See id. at 178.
None of the funds received through Title X grants could be used for programs that
included abortion as a type of family planning. See id. Congress intended this restriction to limit funds solely for preventive family planning services, infertility services, population research, and "other related medical, informational, and educational activities." Id. at 178-79. Furthermore, regulations under the Public Health
Service Act specifically excluded services for pregnancy or prenatal care from qualifying for Title X funds. See id. at 179. The regulations were challenged as an impermissible construction of the Public Health Service Act and also as viewpointdiscriminatory conditions on federal subsidies. See id at 181,192. The United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York upheld the regulations and the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. See id. at 181. The Supreme
Court also upheld the regulations and specifically found that the conditions for
funding were not viewpoint-based. See id. at 192. The Court relied on Maher to reiterate that the government is free to favor childbirth over abortion. See id. at 192-93.
Moreover, the government may endorse this value judgment by allocating federal
funds to support childbirth services. See id. In doing so, the government is not required also to offer funds to organizations that advocate abortion. See id at 193.
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Representation, the Supreme Court stressed that the government does
not discriminate based on viewpoint when it funds one activity instead of another.6 Rather, the Court articulated, the government is
merely enforcing limitations that prevent a grantee from using funds
for activities that fall outside the scope of the subsidy program.6 The
Court emphasized that Congress is free to fix the limits of a publicly
funded program, and in doing so, may refuse to fund speech that is
specifically excluded from the project's scope.'
The result is different, however, when the government allocates
funds to third parties to encourage private speech." In Rosenberger v.
Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia,6 a state university refused
to support a student newspaper that advocated a Christian viewpoint.68 The Court held that when the government creates a limited
public forum," it may not choose to fund some speakers instead of
See id. The Court distinguished viewpoint-discrimination from selective subsidies by indicating that the government is not suppressing speech by funding one
program to the exclusion of another, but rather that the government's selection advances goals that Congress finds to be important to the public interest. See i& Furthermore, Title X grantees are not prevented from engaging in abortion-related
services; they are merely restricted from using Title X funds to finance these activities. See id. at 198. But see Leff, supra note 3, at 384 (stating that the conditions upheld in Rust were, in fact, viewpoint-based and censor other viewpoints because only
one favored perspective was funded); Post, supra note 5, at 170 (arguing that the
Court's decision in Rust is only defensible if the restricted speech is considered as
part of a managerial regime committed to achieving a legitimate goal).
See Rust, 500 U.S. at 194. The Public Service Health Act is designed
to promote preventive family planning and does not recognize abortion as a means of family planning. See id. at 193. The limits placed on Title X fund recipients ensure that
the goals of the act are achieved. See id& Abortion counseling or referral services are
outside the scope of the federal program and are not eligible for funds under Title
X. See id. at 193-94.
6
See id. at 194.
See Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 834
(1995).
67 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
See id. at 822-23, 825.
See id. at 829-30. Justice Kennedy stated that the student activities fund at issue
in Rosenberger "[was] a forum more in a metaphysical than in a spatial or geographic
sense, but the same principles are applicable." Id. at 830. A limited pubic forum
includes public facilities that are used for activities not specifically related to expression. See Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384,
392-93 (1993) (finding that access to a school auditorium after school hours created
a limited public forum); International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee,
505 U.S. 672, 678 (1992) (defining a limited public forum as "property that the State
has opened for expressive activity by part or all of the public"); Cornelius v. NAACP
Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, Inc. 473 U.S. 788, 790, 801-02 (1985) (holding that a
charitable campaign program at federal workplaces was a limited public forum);
Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 47 (1983) (holding
that a school's internal mail system was a limited public forum).
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others based on the viewpoints expressed. 7 The Court, relying on
Rust, acknowledged that when the government funds private speakers
to disseminate its own message, the government is not required to
subsidize opposing viewpoints. 7' The Court concluded, however, that

See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 834. The University of Virginia, a state organization, uses a student activity fund (SAF) to support extracurricular activities that are
related to the school's educational purposes. See id. at 824. Student groups, known
as Contracted Independent Organizations (CIOs), apply for disbursements from the
SAF to support their expenses. See id. The guidelines that govern disbursements
exclude financial support to religious activities, among others. See id. at 825. The
university refused to disburse funds to a third-party contractor on behalf of a CIO,
Wide Awake Productions, because it published a student newspaper that supported
a Christian viewpoint. See id. at 822-23, 825. After appealing within the university,
Wide Awake Productions filed suit, alleging that the SAF's denial of payment constituted impermissible viewpoint discrimination. See Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 795 F. Supp. 175, 177 (W.D. Va. 1992); Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 18 F.3d 269, 274 (4th Cir. 1994). The United
States District Court for the Western District of Virginia granted summary judgment
in favor of the university and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that the SAF guidelines were content-discriminatory; however,
the university had a compelling interest in maintaining the separation between
church and state. See Rosenberger,795 F. Supp. at 184; Rosenbe'ger, 18 F.3d at 288.
The Supreme Court reversed and Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority,
recognized that the distinction between content and viewpoint discrimination may
be imprecise. See Rosenberger,515 U.S. at 831. The Court found that the university's
policy does not prohibit the subject of religion, but disfavors student publications
with religious viewpoints. See id. Justice Kennedy further stated that "[r]eligion may
be a vast area of inquiry, but it also provides, as it did here, a specific premise, a perspective, a standpoint from which a variety of subjects may be discussed and considered." Id Therefore, the university's denial of funding to Wide Awake Productions
constituted viewpoint-discrimination and not subject-matter discrimination. See id.
The Court observed that this conclusion is important because subject-matter discrimination may be permissible if it serves the purpose of the forum. See id at 82930. To the contrary, the Court stated that viewpoint-discrimination is not permissible if the speech would otherwise conform to the forum's purpose. See id. Having
concluded that the SAF was a forum, the Court determined that the subjects discussed in the newspaper published by Wide Awake Productions were within the limits of the SAF guidelines. See id. at 831. Hence, the university's viewpoint discrimination was impermissible. See id. at 832.
7
See Rosenbemger, 515 U.S. at 833. This conclusion rests on the
Court's decision
in Rust, in which the Court held that when government is speaking or when it funds
private speakers to convey its message, it may regulate the content of the expression.
See id. Justice Kennedy further recognized that
the government did not create a program to encourage private speech
but instead used private speakers to transmit specific information pertaining to its own program. We recognized that when the government
appropriates public funds to promote a particular policy of its own it is
entitled to say what it wishes... [and] it may take steps to ensure that
its message is neither garbled nor distorted by the grantee.
Id. (citations omitted).
70
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a policy that funds a wide array of speakers conveying varied messages may not selectively fund only favored viewpoints.2
The RosenbergerCourt also rejected the argument that scarcity of
government funds justifies viewpoint discrimination." Particularly in
the university context, the suppression of ideas and thoughts, the
Court opined, strikes at the heart of First Amendment principles."
The Court, therefore, determined that any restrictions on the funding of private speech must be viewpoint-neutral."
In a recent clash between government subsidies and private
speech, the United States Supreme Court, in NEA v. Finley,76 upheld
the "decency and respect" clause of § 954(d) (1) under the First

See id. at 834-35. The situation in Rosenbergeris therefore different in that the
university, a state organization, is not conveying its own message. See id. at 834.
Rather, the student groups are separate entities from the university and are offered
funds to advance their own messages, not the messages of the university. See id. at
835. The Court stated that
[i]t does not follow... that viewpoint-based restrictions are proper
when the University does not itself speak or subsidize transmittal of a
message it favors but instead expends funds to encourage a diversity of
views from private speakers.... Having offered to pay the third-party
contractors on behalf of private speakers who convey their own messages, the University may not silence the expression of selected viewpoints.
Id. at 834-35.
See id. at 835. Here, the Court stated that "[the] government cannot justify
viewpoint discrimination among private speakers on the economic fact of scarcity."
Id. Justice Kennedy referred to the decision of Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. 384, 393-94,
in which the Court invalidated a school district's rule prohibiting organizations from
using school property after hours for "religious purposes." See Rosenberger, 515 U.S.
at 835; see also Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 393-94 (holding that the district discriminated on the basis of viewpoint because it did not allow the presentation of religious
perspectives on family values on school property). The provision of funds, according to the Court, is not different from access to school facilities because "the underlying premise that the University could discriminate based on viewpoint if demand
for space exceeded its availability is wrong. .. " Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 835.
7P See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 835. The Court
emphasized that the university's
funding restriction, which prohibits publications whose main purpose is to promote
a specific belief in or with regard to a deity, would have a "chilling effect" on student
speech and creativity. See id. at 836. Justice Kennedy specified that
the prohibition.. . would bar funding of essays by hypothetical student
contributors named Plato, Spinoza, and Descartes ....
Karl Marx,
Bertrand Russell, and Jean-Paul Sartre would likewise have some of
their major essays excluded from student publications ....
Plato
could contrive perhaps to submit an acceptable essay on making pasta
or peanut butter cookies provided he did not point out their
(necessary) imperfections.
Id. at 836-37.
75 See id. at 835.
76 118 S. Ct. 2168 (1998).
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Amendment." Rather than restrict the NEA from subsidizing indecent or disfavored viewpoints, the Court determined that § 954(d) (1)
proffers additional criteria for the NEA to consider during its selection process. 8 Although the Court recognized that decency and respect standards might be imprecise, the majority held that
§ 954(d) (1) should survive a vagueness challenge because all of the
factors considered during the NEA's evaluation of artistic merit are
inherently subjective.7
Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor began the opinion by
reviewing the history of the NEA.r The Justice emphasized the
NEA's discretionary role in arts funding and identified criteria by
which the organization distributes awards." Justice O'Connor further explained the application and awards process, 2 noting that onl
a small percentage of NEA grants have led to public controversy.
Nonetheless, the Justice discussed Congress's attempts to reform the
agency's grant-making process in 1990, which resulted in the adoption of§ 954(d)(1)."
See id. at 2172 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 954(d) (1) (1994)).

Seeid. at2176.
See id at 2177.
so See id. at 2172.
81 See id The NEA's enabling statute lists broad funding priorities. See id. For
78
79

example, the NEA seeks to support projects that achieve "'artistic and cultural significance, giving emphasis to American creativity and cultural diversity,'
'professional excellence,' and the encouragement of 'public knowledge, education,
understanding, and appreciation of the arts.'" Id (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 954(c)(1)(10)).
82 See Finley, 118 S. Ct. at 2172. Applications are first reviewed
by an advisory
panel comprised of experts in the particular field. See id. These panels are required
to reflect "'diverse artistic and cultural points of view'" because they are composed
of people of "'wide geographic, ethnic, and minority representation,'" plus laypersons "'who are knowledgeable about the arts.'" Id. (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 959(c)(1)(2)). The panel reports its opinion to the Council, which in turn makes recommendations to the Chairperson on funding decisions. See id. Wielding the ultimate
authority on grant decisions, the Chairperson is nonetheless prohibited from approving an applicant who was given a negative recommendation by the Council. See
id. (citing 20 U.S.C. § 955(f)).
See id. Justice O'Connor noted that the NEA has awarded more than three
billion dollars to arts organizations and individuals while prompting increased support for the arts on state, corporate, and foundation levels. See id Despite this success, the Justice discussed the controversy surrounding the NEA funding of two artists, Andres Serrano and Robert Mapplethorpe. See id.; see also supra note 14
(discussing congressional reaction to Serrano's and Mapplethorpe's works).
See Finley, 118 S. CL at 2173. The Court explained that congressional reaction
to these two grants included a reduction in the NEA's budget (by the exact amount
previously given to Serrano and Mapplethorpe) and an amendment that prohibited
NEA funds to "'be used to promote, disseminate, or produce materials which in the
judgment of [the NEA] may be considered obscene .... '" Id. at 2172 (alteration in
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Justice O'Connor prefaced the Court's substantive analysis by
stressing that Finley, in order to advance a facial constitutional challenge, had to demonstrate that the application of § 954(d) (1) would
inevitably suppress speech.' The Court then segued into a discussion
of viewpoint discrimination, finding error in the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of § 954(d) (1)." The Court declined to read the provision as an ultimate restriction on awards to artists deemed "indecent"
or "disrespectful."87 Rather, the Court determined that the text of
§ 954(d) (1) is merely advisory language to be considered in the
overall evaluation of a grant application.8 This language, noted Justice O'Connor, stands in stark contrast to the unambiguous language
of other funding restrictions, such as § 954(d) (2), which clearly states
that obscene art will not be funded.'
original) (quoting Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations
Act, Pub. L. 101-121, 103 Stat. 738, 738-742 (1990)). The Court continued by noting
that the NEA complied with this amendment by requiring all grant recipients to certify that they would not use NEA funds for projects that were inconsistent with this
amendment. See id. at 2173. This certification requirement was later found unconstitutionally vague. See Bella Lewitzky Dance Found. v. Frohnmayer, 754 F. Supp.
774, 782 (C.D. Cal. 1991).
The Court discussed the Independent Commission (Commission) appointed by
Congress to review the NEA's grant-making process and emphasized the Commission's recommendations for procedural changes that would enhance the advisory
panels' role. See Finley, 118 S. Ct. at 2173. Based on this suggestion and pending
challenges to the funding restrictions of the 1990 appropriations bill, the Court
stated that Congress eventually came to a bipartisan compromise by enacting the
Williams-Coleman Amendment to the NEA's reauthorization. See id.; see also supra
note 15 (discussing congressional ratification of the Williams-Coleman amendment).
This amendment became 20 U.S.C. § 954(d)(1). See Finley, 118 S. Ct. at 2176.
SeeFinley, 118 S. Ct. at 2175; see also Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 183 (1991)
("'A facial challenge to a legislative Act is, of course, the most difficult challenge to
mount successfully... .'") (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745
(1987)); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973) (finding that facial invalidation "is, manifestly, strong medicine" and "has been employed by the Court sparingly and only as a last resort"); FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 223
(1990) (stating that "facial challenges to legislation are generally disfavored.... .").
See Finley, 118 S. Ct. at 2175; see also supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text
(discussing the Ninth Circuit's holding).
87 SeeFinley, 118 S. Ct. at 2175.
W See id. Justice O'Connor stated that the NEA views § 954(d) (1) as hortatory;
therefore, "decency" and "respect" are merely additional considerations to be appraised during the grant-making process. See id. The Justice explained that the NEA
has implemented this provision by securing representatives from diverse cultural,
ethnic, religious, and professional backgrounds to serve on the advisory panels. See
id. These panels will provide a wide array of views on decency and respect when
considering a grant application, theJustice reasoned. See id. at 2173-74. Despite the
NEA's reliance on these advisory panels, Justice O'Connor refused to decide
whether this method sufficiently complied with the demands of § 954(d)(1). See id
at 2175.
89 See id. at 2176. Justice O'Connor buttressed her conclusion that this provision
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Next, the Court contended that Congress adopted the "decency
and respect" clause as a bipartisan compromise designed to save the
NEA from elimination by steering clear of viewpoint-based criteria
for funding." Justice O'Connor stressed that Congress specifically
chose not to prohibit particular viewpoints in funding decisions, but
rather to incorporate additional criteria in the selection process further to define artistic excellence.9' The Justice noted that these additional criteria, found in § 954(d) (1), do not force the NEA categorically to deny funding based on viewpoint-discriminatory standards.
Having determined that Congress adopted § 954(d) (1) as a
means of reforming funding procedures instead of restricting
speech, Justice O'Connor reiterated that the provision would not ultimately encourage invidious viewpoint discrimination. The Justice
explained that in order to consider § 954(d) (1) facially unconstitutional, there must be substantial danger of First Amendment violations. 4 Unlike other statutes invalidated by the Supreme Court on
is only hortatory by contrasting it with § 954(d) (2), which is a clear and concise restriction against the funding of obscene speech. See id. Referring to § 954(d) (2),
which provides that obscenity will not be funded because it is not protected speech
and because it lacks artistic merit, theJustice reasoned that "[w]hen Congress has in
fact intended to affirmatively constrain the NEA's grant-making authority, it has
done so in no uncertain terms." Id.
See id. Justice O'Connor discredited the artists' assertion that § 954(d) (1) discriminates on the basis of viewpoint, because the amendment was adopted specifically
to avoid enacting other proposed amendments that would have restricted the funding of certain categories of speech. See id. For instance, the Crane Amendment,
which would have essentially eliminated the NEA, was rejected by the House. See id.
at 2173. The Court observed that the Rohrabacher Amendment mandated a restriction on grants to art that intends to denigrate the beliefs, objects, or tenets of a specific religion, or intends to denigrate an individual or group of people based on
race, gender, national origin, or handicap. See id. at 2173. The Court noted that the
Rohrabacher Amendment was also rejected. See id. Justice O'Connor indicated that
the sponsors of § 954(d)(1) intended to avoid viewpoint-discrimination altogether.
See id. at 2176.
91 See id. Justice O'Connor discussed the Independent Commission
Report,
which cautioned Congress not to adopt viewpoint-based criteria for funding. See id.
Further, the Justice noted that this report suggested that the additional criteria for
selection should be included as a part of the selection process, rather than treated as
an isolated consideration. See id.
See id. Based on the Independent Commission Report's recommendation,
Congress reformed the NEA's award process to include the criteria in § 954(d) (1) to
"inform the assessment of artistic merit ....
Id.
93 See Finley, 118 S. Ct. at 1276. In fact, the Justice noted later in the opinion that
the artists were not alleging discrimination in any one particular funding decision.
See id. at 2178. Further, two of the artists received NEA grants after filing this action
against § 954(d) (1). See id. The Justice cautioned, however, that if the NEA used
subjective criteria to manipulate awards into a penalty upon disfavored ideas, then
§ 954(d) (1) would be constitutionally suspect. See id.
See id. at 2176. Justice O'Connor contrasted the present case with the Su-
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facial challenges, here, the Court perceived no danger that the
"decency and respect" clause would suppress speech because it does
not threaten censorship or punish the expression of particular
ideas. 95 In fact, Justice O'Connor noted that considerations of
"decency" and "respect" are open to many interpretations that will
inevitably encompass a wide array of thoughts and ideas.9 The Justice further rejected Finley's argument that the NEA could exploit
this subjectivity to employ viewpoint discrimination, noting that the
"decency and respect" criteria are no more subjective than is the
agency's decision on artistic merit.97
The Court next discussed several constitutional applications for
the "decency and respect" clause, including educational programs
and projects that promote cultural diversity.98 The Court opined that
preme Court's decision in R.A.Y v. St. Pau, 505 U.S. 377, 380 (1992). SeeFinley, 118
S. Ct. at 2176. In RA.V., the Court struck down on its face a municipal ordinance
that threatened criminal liability for placing a symbol "'which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm, or resentment in others on the basis
of race, color, creed, religion, or gender'" on public or private property. KA.V., 505
U.S. at 391, 380 (quoting MINN. STAT. § 609.713(1) (Supp. 1987)). The Justice recounted that the Court found that the provision set forth a penalty for the expression of particular views, prohibited expression of "disfavored subjects," and suppressed "distinctive idea[s] conveyed by a distinctive message." Id. at 391, 393.
See Finley, 118 S. Ct. at 2176. The Justice stated that the Court does not perceive a realistic danger that § 954(d)(1) will silence speakers or compromise First
Amendment liberties, as was the case with the ordinance in LA.V. 'See id. Justice
O'Connor stressed that the "decency and respect" criteria, unlike the criminal penalty in RA.V, "do not engender the kind of directed viewpoint discrimination that
would prompt this Court to invalidate a statute on its face." Id.
See id. at 2176-77. Justice O'Connor noted the Respondent's argument that it
would be difficult to find two people who would agree on what type of art is decent
or whether a particular piece of art respects them. See id. at 2176.
97 See id. at 2177. Justice O'Connor, indicating that § 954(d)(1)
is unlikely to
cause the NEA's grant-selection process to become any more selective, refused to
strike down legislation based on "'its hypothetical application to situations not before the Court.'" Id. (quoting FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 743 (1978)).
98 See id. Justice O'Connor referenced the NEA's enabling statute to conclude
that educational programs are a main focus of the NEA. See id. (citing 20 U.S.C.
§ 951(9) (1994) ("'Americans should receive in school, background and preparation
in the arts and humanities . . . .'"); § 954(c) (5) (stating that NEA's funding goals include "'projects and productions that will encourage public knowledge, education,
understanding, and appreciation of the arts'")); see also supra note 12 (discussing
§ 951, the NEA's enabling statute, which lists commitment to education as a primary
goal of the NEA). Therefore, the Justice reasoned, "'decency' is a permissible factor
where 'educational suitability' motivates its consideration." Finley, 118 S.Ct. at 2177
(citing Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S.
853, 871 (1982)).
The Justice found permissible applications of the "respect" prong of
§ 954(d) (1) as well. SeeFinley, 118 S.Ct. at 2177 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 951(10) ("'[Ilt
is vital to democracy to honor and preserve its multicultural artistic heritage.'")
(alteration in original); § 954(c) (4) (the NEA explicitly considers diversity by giving
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applications of § 954(d) (1) in contexts not specifically contemplated
by the NEA's enabling statute would not necessarily suppress protected speech.9 Moreover, the Court noted that content-based considerations are inherent to arts funding when only a small majority of
deserving artists will receive grants.' °
Following this line of reasoning, the Court discredited Finley's
0 ' Justice O'Connor declared that the comreliance on Rosenberger.'
petitive nature of the NEA's funding procedures requires the agency
to make content-based conclusions to determine artistic excellence.'02
The Court concluded that Rosenberger was unpersuasive because the
3
funding criteria in Rosenbergerdid not require a similar threshold.'
Justice O'Connor further justified § 954(d) (1) by stressing that
Congress has wide discretion in setting funding priorities.'04 The
Court explained that Congress may selectively subsidize a program
that serves a public purpose as long as other constitutionally prospecial consideration to "'projects and productions... that reach, or reflect the culture of, a minority, inner city, rural, or tribal community"'); § 954(c)(1) (the NEA
also gives special consideration to projects that emphasize cultural diversity)).
99 See Finley, 118 S.Ct. at 2177.
100 See id. Justice O'Connor recognized that the NEA denies a majority of the applications it receives, even those that are both artistically meritorious and constitutionally
protected, for a variety of reasons, including: technical proficiency, creativity, public
interest, educational value, suitability for target audiences, etc. See id. at 2177-78
(citing Brief for Petitioners at 32, Finley (No. 97-371); see also Finley v. NEA, 100 F.3d
671, 685 (9th Cir. 1996) (Kleinfeld,J., dissenting) (observing that competitive grant
programs will invariably deny funds to some constitutionally protected individuals).
The Justice also noted that the NEA's competitive award process, which bases funding decisions on artistic worth, cannot be neutral. See Finley, 118 S. Ct. at 2178.
See Finley, 118 S. Ct. at 2178 (citing Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the
Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 837 (1995)).
102 See id. The Justice indicated that the NEA's award process,
unlike the subsidy
program at issue in Rosenberger, relies on aesthetic judgments and funds only those
artists who achieve "the inherently content-based 'excellence' threshold .... " Id.
10s See id.
The allocation of student activities funds in Rosenberger, Justice
O'Connor noted, was made available to all student groups that were related to the
university's educational purpose. See id. This standard, continued the Justice, is objective, unlike the NEA's subjective process. See id. at 2178; see also Lamb's Chapel v.
Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 393 (1993) (holding that a
school district's ban on the use of the school auditorium for religious purposes was
not viewpoint-neutral); Southeastern Promotions Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 552
(1975) (holding that a municipal theater that allows any group to perform may not
ban a production of "Hair," even if another theater is available).
104 See Finley, 118 S. Ct. at 2179. Justice Ginsburg did not join in this
part of the
opinion. See id. at 2171. Justice O'Connor maintained that Congress has wide discretion in determining spending priorities and "that the Government may allocate
competitive funding according to criteria that would be impermissible were direct
regulation of speech or a criminal penalty at stake." Id. at 2179; see also supra notes
57-60 and accompanying text (discussing Regan v. Taxation with Representation,
461 U.S. 540 (1983)).
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tected rights are not compromised.' 5 Accordingly, the Court held
that the NEA did not engage in viewpoint discrimination when it denied Finley's grant,
but rather that the NEA chose to fund one artist
0 6
over another.'

Finally, the Court concluded that § 954(d) (1) is not unconstitutionally vague. 0 7 Recognizing that although the provision is imprecise, the Court opined that individuals will not be deterred from creating art that might infringe upon the "forbidden area" with regard
to these federal grants.'08 Furthermore, the Court determined that
the provision only contributes inexact considerations to an inherently subjective selection process."° Accordingly, the Court reversed
the Ninth Circuit decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.1
In a concurring opinion, Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, agreed that § 954(d) (1) is constitutional; however, the Justice
stated that the provision establishes both content-based and viewpoint-based criteria for application evaluations."' Justice Scalia explained that Congress intended the decency criteria to be considered
in evaluating each grant application, therefore, the language of

105

See Finley, 118 S. Ct. at 2179. Rust teaches, according to justice O'Connor, that

Congress may choose to fund one program over another in order to.encourage activities that are in the public interest. See id. In the present case, the Justice explained that Congress revamped the NEA's enabling act in 1990 to mandate that
"arts funding should 'contribute to public support and confidence in the use of taxpayer funds' and that '[p]ublic funds... must ultimately serve public purposes the
Congress defines.'" Id. (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 951(5) (1994)) (alteration in original).
Therefore, the selective funding of artists who further Congressional goals is not
viewoint-discrimination. See id.
See id.

See id.
See id. Despite the imprecision of § 954(d) (1),Justice O'Connor stressed that
"when the Government is acting as patron rather than as sovereign, the consequences of imprecision are not constitutionally severe." Id.
Justice O'Connor also surmised that other government grant and scholarship
programs award funds based on subjective considerations, such as "excellence." See
107

108

id. at 2179-80; see also 2 U.S.C. § 802(a) (1994) (Congressional Award program

"designed to promote initiative, achievement, and excellence among youths in the
areas of public service, personal development, and physical and expedition fitness");
20 U.S.C. § 956(c)(1) (1994) (providing funds based on "progress and scholarship
in the humanities"). To invalidate § 954(d) (1) on vagueness grounds, the Justice
contended, would challenge the constitutionality of other valuable government
scholarship programs. SeeFinley, 118 S. Ct. at 2180.
l0 See Finley, 118 S.Ct. at 2180; see also supra note 89 and accompanying text
(noting that the "decency and respect" clause is merely hortatory).
See Finley, 118 S. Ct. at 2180.
See id (ScaliaJ., concurring).
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§ 954(d) (1) is not merely advisory. ' 2 To conclude that the "decency"
clause is only hortatory, the Justice continued, renders § 954(d) (1)
wholly unnecessary because § 959(c) already requires the chairperson to compose advisory panels of persons with diverse artistic and
cultural viewpoints."" Therefore, Justice Scalia concluded that the
NEA's implementation of § 954(d) (1), by securing diverse panels to
4
provide a wide array of views on decency and respect, is duplicative.Y
Agreeing with the majority that § 954(d) (1) does not require denialof applications that violate standards of decency and respect, Justice Scalia explained that the NEA decision-makers will favor applicants that comport with this criteria over those that do not."5
Therefore, the Justice determined that the "decency and respect"
clause constitutes viewpoint discrimination.1 6 Such a conclusion is
not affected, Justice Scalia surmised, by the subjectivity of the terms
"decency" and "respect.""7 Justice Scalia also disagreed with the majority's analysis of the legislative history of § 954(d) (1), finding that
11 See id. Justice Scalia observed that decency may be
an element of artistic excellence and merit or a factor to be considered in addition to artistic excellence and
merit. See id. The Justice concluded that "either way, it is entirely, 100% clear that
decency and respect are to be taken into account in evaluating applications." Id.
Although Justice Scalia did not suggest that the decency criteria are dispositive in
every case, the Justice stated that they must be considered in every case. See id. at
2181 (ScaliaJ., concurring).
Justice Scalia read § 954(d) (1) to mean that the evaluators must take into consideration the "decency" and "respect" criteria. See id. at 2180 (Scalia, J., concurring). The Justice found this conclusion so clear that it was inexplicable "what the
Court ha[d] in mind (other than the gutting of the statute) when it speculate[d]
that the statute is merely 'advisory.'" Id.
113 See id. at 2181 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing 20 U.S.C. §
959(c), which requires the Chairperson to promulgate rules to ensure that the panels are comprised
of individuals who represent diversity and multiculturalism).
Justice Scalia opined that the Chairperson has no way of ensuring that these
panels take decency factors into account when reviewing applications, although if
the panel does consider this criteria, it is likely to assess a candidate in a manner
consistent with American values. See id.
,14 See id.
,15 See id. The Justice opined that, if all other factors are equal, an applicant who
displays disrespect for American beliefs and values is less likely to receive a grant
than is an applicant who displays respect. See id.
n6 See Finley, 118 S. Ct. at 2181 (&alia, J., concurring). The justice stated that although the statute does not require the denial of funding to applicants who exhibit
disrespect for American values, it is just as discriminatory as "a provision imposing a
five-point handicap on all black applicants for civil service jobs (but which does not]
comTpel the rejection of black applicants." Id.
See id. at 2181-82 (Scalia, J., concurring). The Justice analogized the subjectivity of § 954(d)(1) to a provision favoring "'Republican-party values' [which] would
be rendered nondiscriminatory by the fact that there is plenty of room for argument
as to what Republican-party values might be." Id. at 2182 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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instead of a mere procedural alteration, this clause was meant to discriminate against the public funding of projects such as Serrano's
"Piss Christ" and Mapplethorpe's homoerotic photographs." 8 The
Justice further discredited the fact that § 954(d) (1) was a bipartisan
proposal,"9 noting that the motives of Congress are of little importance compared with the plain text of the statute.'2
Having concluded that § 954(d) (1) is viewpoint discriminatory,
Justice Scalia turned to the issue of whether such discrimination violates the First Amendment. 2 ' Justice Scalia opined that Congress did
not abridge indecent speech because artists are still free to create
works that are disrespectful of the public's beliefs and values; however, this same scorned public is not forced to finance these projects.In Justice Scalia also argued that the NEA is not the only source
of funding for artists and, like every other federal subsidy program,
the government can choose to fund programs that encourage activities for the public good without abridging an applicant's freedom of
speech.'"
Although Justice Scalia agreed that Finley's reliance on Rosenberger was misplaced, the Justice's opinion departed from the majority's application of the First Amendment to federal funding. 2 4 The
Justice asserted that the First Amendment does not constrain the
18 See id. at 2182 (Scalia, J., concurring).
1
See id. Justice Scalia proclaimed that "[i]t matters not whether this enactment
was the product of the most partisan alignment in history or whether, upon its passage, the Members all linked arms and sang, 'The more we get together, the happier
we'll be.'" Id.
120 See id. Despite the fact that § 954(d) (1) was enacted as an alternative
to a proposal that would have mandated clear viewpoint discrimination, Justice Scalia commented that "[w]e do not judge statutes as if we are surveying the scene of an accident; each one is reviewed, not on the basis of how much worse it could have been,
but on the basis of what it says." Id.
121 See id.
1
See Finley, 118 S. Ct. at 2182-83 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia underscored this analysis with legal precedent establishing that a denial of a taxpayer subsidy is not the same as suppression of dangerous ideas. See id. at 2183 (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (citing Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 550
(1983)); see also Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 237 (1987)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that a denial of a taxpayer subsidy "does not necessarily 'infringe' [upon] a fundamental right... [because] unlike direct restriction or
prohibition - such a denial does not, as a general rule, have any significant coercive
effect").
123 See Finley, 118 S. Ct. at 2182-83 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia,
relying
on Rust, emphasized that the government can, without violating the First Amendment, assign funds to projects deemed important for the public without an obligation to fund alternative programs. See id. at 2183 (ScaliaJ., concurring).
12 See id. at 2184 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995)).
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government's ability to allocate both competitive and noncompetitive
funds'25 Just as the First Amendment has no application to funding,
the Justice contended that neither does the vagueness doctrine.'"
The Justice explained that the rule against vague legislation applies
to the government's regulation of expressive conduct, not to government grant programs.'2 As such, the Justice clearly found viewpointbased, and content-based, restrictions appropriate in government
funding because they do not abridge the freedom of speech.'" Justice Scalia observed that Congress could ban the funding of indecent
art altogether, but instead Congress took the lesser step of disfavoring indecent speech through "decency and respect" considerations.'
Justice Scalia concluded that "[t]he Court' s opinion today renders
even that lesser step a nullity."''
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Souter also found that
§ 954(d) (1) constituted viewpoint discrimination but stressed that in
the context of federal patronage of the arts, such discrimination violates the First Amendment.' 3' Justice Souter chided the Court for
creating an exception to First Amendment restrictions when the govSee id. Referring to the majority's statement that the government is permitted
to allocate funding based on criteria that would be impermissible if criminal liability
or direct regulation of speech were at issue, Justice Scalia opined that the Court believes that the First Amendment requires some constraints on funding, but that the
Court failed to elaborate on this assertion. See id.
1

126See

id.

See id. The Justice indicated that if the vagueness doctrine did apply in the
funding context, then the phrase "artistic excellence" could be considered even
more vague than "decency" and "respect":
[T]he agency charged with making grants under a statutory standard
of "artistic excellence" - and which has itself thought that standard
met by everything from the playing of Beethoven to a depiction of a
crucifix immersed in urine - would be of more dubious constitutional
validity than the "decency" and "respect" limitations that respondents
(who demand to be judged on the same strict standard of "artistic excellence") have the humorlessness to call too vague.
Id. at 2184-85 (Scalia, J., concurring).
128 See id. at 2184 (ScaliaJ., concurring).
29 See Finley, 118 S. Ct. at 2185 (Scalia, J., concurring).
"0
Id Justice Scalia argued that the NEA implemented § 954(d) (1) by charging
the Chairman with the duty to ensure diverse advisory panels that would encompass
a wide array of views on "decency and respect." See id. at 2181 (Scalia, J., concurring). However, Justice Scalia observed that § 959(c) already requires the Chairperson to create such diverse panels and, therefore, § 954(d) (1) is redundant. See id.
Justice Scalia declared that "'[t]he operation was a success, but the patient died.'
What such a procedure is to medicine, the Court's opinion in this case is to law." Id.
131 See id. at 2185 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter stated that by subsidizing
a variety of artists, the government is neither acting in its government-as-speaker
role, nor in its government-as-buyer role, whereby viewpoint discrimination is constitutional. See id. at 2190 (SouterJ., dissenting).
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ernment acts as a patron.3 2 Justice Souter concluded that the NEA is
much like the Rosenbergerstudent activities fund in that money is allocated to encourage a variety of private speakers and, therefore, the
government may not discriminate based on viewpoint.33
The Supreme Court's decision in Finley offers a splintered and
fairly weak ruling in the increasingly confusing area of federal subsidies and the role of the First Amendment. Although § 954(d) (1)
survived both viewpoint-discriminatory and vagueness challenges, the
most starting aspect of this legal battle is that there was no clear winner."' Proponents of § 954(d) (1) may discover federal funds used to
support indecent, albeit meritorious, art in the future because the
Court deemed the "decency and respect" clause to be merely advisory, thus imposing no additional constraints on NEA grants.
Opponents of this legislation may fear the suppression of ideas and the
abridgment of speech, yet the Supreme Court has virtually neutralized such a threat by converting the "decency and respect" criteria

See id.
See idiat 2191 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995)). Justice Souter indicated that the
NEA's purpose was to "'support new ideas' and 'to help create and sustain... a climate encouraging freedom of thought, imagination, and inquiry.'" Id. (quoting 20
U.S.C. § 951(10) (3) (1994)). The Justice stated that "[sio long as Congress chooses
to subsidize expressive endeavors at large, it has no business requiring the NEA to
turn down funding applications of artists and exhibitors who devote their 'freedom
of thought, imagination, and inquiry' to defying our tastes, our beliefs, or our values." Id. Justice Souter also equated the scarcity of funds in Rosenberger with the
competition for NEA grants. See id. at 2192 (Souter, J., dissenting). Therefore, the
Justice disagreed with the Court that the competitive nature of NEA funds distinguished the Finley case from Rosenberger. See id.
l3 Despite the eight to one vote, both Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas
concurred in the judgment only and agreed with Justice Souter that § 954(d) (1) was
viewpoint discriminatory. See Finley, 118 S.Ct. at 2180 (Scalia, J., concurring). Further, Justice Ginsburg did not join in the majority's conclusion that the government
may utilize greater discretion in competitive-funding decisions than in direct regulations of speech. See id. at 2171.
In upholding § 954(d)(1), Justice O'Connor read the provision as merely advisory, perhaps reducing it to optional criteria for advisory panels to consider. See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text (discussing the hortatory nature of
§ 954(d)(1)); see also supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text (discussing the duplicative effect of implementing § 954(d) (1) when § 954(c) already calls for the
formation of diverse advisory panels). On the other hand, by allowing the subjective
criteria of "decency and respect" to remain in the statute, the potential for viewpoint-based discrimination is present if a panel disfavors indecent art.
1
See Finley, 118 S. Ct. at 2175. Justice O'Connor stated that § 954(d) (1) "does
not preclude awards to projects that might be deemed 'indecent' or 'disrespectful,'
nor place conditions on grants, or even specify that those factors must be given any
particular weight in reviewing an application." Id.
132
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into imprecise considerations that can be ignored'm It is clear, however, that future "as-applied" challenges to § 954(d) (1) are possible if
NEA funds are manipulated or used to suppress certain ideas in the
marketplace. 3'7

The Finley decision does nothing to clarify the longstanding debate over government support for the arts. As both the concurring
and dissenting opinions point out, the text of § 954(d) (1) appears to
have successfully cloaked viewpoint-based criteria as a procedural
guideline; therefore, a better debate is whether the government can
discriminate on the basis of viewpoint when acting as a patron of the
arts.' " The Court failed to discuss this issue directly, indicating only
that competitive funding may be allocated based on criteria that
would not be constitutional in a regulatory context.'"
See On Speech Issues, Court Speaks inMany Tongues, N.J. L.J., Aug. 24, 1998, at
S12 ("[R]educing Section 954(d)(1) to 'considerations' that can be ignored - as
Justice O'Connor argued - seems to undermine what Congress sought to do and is
almost as disingenuous as the government's position that the provision is simply a
mandate for diversity in the composition of panels.").
137 See Finley, 118 S. Ct. at 2178-79. Justice O'Connor emphasized
that "[i]f the
NEA were to leverage its power to award subsidies on the basis of subjective criteria
into a penalty on disfavored viewpoints, then we would confront a different case."
Id. at 2178.
138 Justice O'Connor accepted the government's argument
that the provision was
incorporated to reform procedures. See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text
(observing that § 954(d) (1) was adopted as an alternative to other proposals that
would have restricted the funding of certain categories of speech). Justice Souter
acknowledged that if the Chairperson does consider decency and respect through
regulations that ensure diversity of panels, the statute would be satisfied. See Finley,
118 S.Ct. at 2188 (Souter, J., dissenting). However, Justice Souter disputed the application of this provision to reforming procedures because "[t]he reference to considering decency and respect occurs in the subparagraph speaking to the 'criteria by
which applications are judged,' not in the preamble directing the Chairperson to
adopt regulations; it is in judging applications that decency and respect are most obviously to be considered." Id.; see also Finley, 118 S.Ct. at 2182 (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that the legislative history of § 954(d)(1) "in no way propels the
Court's leap to the countertextual conclusion that the provision was merely 'aimed
at reforming procedures. .. ").
1
See Finley, 118 S. Ct. at 2179. Justice Souter argued that this language creates
an exception to the traditional government-as-speaker and government-as-buyer
roles, in which the government is constitutionally able to engage in viewpoint discrimination. See id. at 2190 (Souter, J., dissenting). When the government itself is
speaking, or funds private speakers to disseminate its message, the government is
allowed to discriminate on the basis of viewpoint. See id. at 2179. Justice Souter
noted that the NEA does not fit into the government-as-speaker category, because
the message is not the NEA's, nor does it fit into the government-as-buyer role, because the NEA is not purchasing anything with NEA grants. See id. at 2190 (Souter,
J., dissenting). Yet, as Justice Souter pointed out, the majority allowed the NEA to
act as a patron of the arts with less stringent First Amendment guidelines. See id.
The Court did not explicitly address this issue because the majority held that the
"decency and respect" clause was not viewpoint discriminatory. See id. at 2179.
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The Court failed to find that § 954(d) (1) discriminates on the
basis of viewpoint by relying on the plain language of the statute and
its legislative history, but the Court's discussion of legal precedent is
troubling. Relying on Rust, the Court asserts that the government
can choose selectively to fund programs for the public good, yet Rust
only controls when the government is promoting its own message or
policy.'40 In this case, as the dissent suggests, the underlying goal of
the NEA is to act as a patron, endorsing new ideas and encouraging
freedom of thought from individuals or groups."" Therefore, the messages disseminated by subsidized artists are not the NEA's messages
and do not fall squarely under the ruling in Rust, which would allow
viewpoint discrimination in these funding
.
Additionally,
Rosenbergerteaches that the government may not favor one viewpoint
over another when it allocates funds to encourage a diversity of views,
yet the Court narrowed Rosenberger to apply to noncompetitive funding scenarios unlike the NEA's grant-making process.'
The Finley decision explored the difficulties of applying objective
standards - the constitutional right to be free from vague laws and
viewpoint discrimination - to the inherently subjective topic of art.
Although the NEA's "decency and respect" criteria has been validated by the Supreme Court, this victory may be short-lived. The
true winner in this battle is yet to be determined because the Court
has left the door wide open for "as-applied" challenges to
§ 954(d) (1) should its implementation lead to the suppression of our
country's artistic voices.
Linda A. Mellina

140

See Finley, 118 S.Ct. at 2179; see also supra notes 61-65 (discussing Rust v. Sulli-

van, 500 U.S. 173 (1991)).

141See Finley, 118 S.Ct. at 2191 (Souter,J., dissenting). But see 20 U.S.C.
§ 951(5)
(1994) (providing that funding of artists should contribute to public confidence regarding the utilization of taxpayer funds). Perhaps the Court evaluated the NEA
grants as promoting the government's message on the arts because the NEA's purpose was also modified in 1990 to read: "Public funds.., must ultimately serve public purposes the Congress defines." 20 U.S.C. § 951(5).
SeeFinly, 118 S. Ct. at 2191 (SouterJ., dissenting).
1
See id. at 2179; see also supra notes 66-75 and accompanying text (discussing Rosenberger). But see Finley, 118 S.Ct. at 2192 (Souter, J., dissenting) (equating scarcity
of funds with competitive funds, and finding no difference between the student activities fund and the NEA funds).

